Post by account_disabled on Mar 8, 2024 23:08:03 GMT -5
Johnson's endorsement of Trump makes good sense as part of Johnson's campaign to take the case for supporting Ukraine to the White House, which is where it seems increasingly likely Trump will end up. Johnson's tactic seems to be to flatter Trump into doing the right thing, or at any rate to stay close enough to Trump to have his ear to him. There may also be an element on Johnson's part of hedging his personal bets with Trump and those who back him, and ensuring he remains persona grata in conservative circles and speaking circuits in the US and elsewhere. In hedging bets Johnson will not be alone. Leaders and potential leaders of all those countries who prize the US as an ally will want to be on the best possible terms with the person now most likely to be the next President of the United States. The latest follower in Johnson's footsteps is NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg, who in Washington expressed withfidence that the US under Trump would remain in NATO. But his forecast was linked to a strong pitch to US legislation that support for Ukraine and NATO was very much in the US's interest.
But whatever the blandishments of Boris Johnson or anybody else, a confident second-time-round Trump could still ditch Ukraine and signal to Putin that the US is no longer in the business of defending Europe at the American taxpayer's expense. This would have huge consequences for NATO, the EU, and the balance of power in Europe, as I spelled out in some detail in a blog for Fide here. The prospect of Trump in the White House has prompted warnings of war with Russia Trump in the White House is a key if usually unspoken element in the flurry of recent warnings by top military officials in Europe that war with Russia could USA Phone Number come as soon as in the next five years. Ditching Ukraine could mean Ukraine and its allies would be pressured into accepting a cease-fire/”peace” settlement which would make permanent the present de facto division of Ukrainian territory between Ukraine and Russia. If Ukraine refused a settlement and continued fighting Russia to regain its territory, NATO allies in Europe could back Ukraine with increased military aid, which already in total equals military aid from the US.
But increased European aid would be unlikely to fully compensate for the loss of US aid, not least because countries providing it would be struggling to replenish stocks of weapons already supplied to Ukraine, while at the same time upgrading their own war-fighting capabilities. With the withdrawal of the US as a credible player in NATO, whether it formally withdrew from the alliance or not, the threat of Russia's nuclear arsenal would enter the equation. President Putin recently pointed out that Russia had more nuclear warheads than NATO (including the US), and described this as Russia's “competitive advantage”. With Ukraine's neighbors no longer shielded by the US nuclear umbrella, Russian might lose its inhibitions about the threat or use of its significant arsenal of battlefield nuclear weapons, some which are now based in Belarus, which borders Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian war-fighting ability has been depleted by the war with Ukraine, and NATO's European allies might have a breathing space of a Presidential term or two before Russia could contemplate further military adventures. Yet whatever the European allies did with that breathing space, they could not compensate for the loss of the US's nuclear umbrella. On that basis I have argued that the best strategy for Europe's NATO allies, if Trump gains the White House and pulls the plug on Ukraine and NATO, it is a political campaign to bring the administration after Trump back into NATO. Until then, the European allies would have to hold the line against Russia with their existing and hopefully expanding conventional military forces.
But whatever the blandishments of Boris Johnson or anybody else, a confident second-time-round Trump could still ditch Ukraine and signal to Putin that the US is no longer in the business of defending Europe at the American taxpayer's expense. This would have huge consequences for NATO, the EU, and the balance of power in Europe, as I spelled out in some detail in a blog for Fide here. The prospect of Trump in the White House has prompted warnings of war with Russia Trump in the White House is a key if usually unspoken element in the flurry of recent warnings by top military officials in Europe that war with Russia could USA Phone Number come as soon as in the next five years. Ditching Ukraine could mean Ukraine and its allies would be pressured into accepting a cease-fire/”peace” settlement which would make permanent the present de facto division of Ukrainian territory between Ukraine and Russia. If Ukraine refused a settlement and continued fighting Russia to regain its territory, NATO allies in Europe could back Ukraine with increased military aid, which already in total equals military aid from the US.
But increased European aid would be unlikely to fully compensate for the loss of US aid, not least because countries providing it would be struggling to replenish stocks of weapons already supplied to Ukraine, while at the same time upgrading their own war-fighting capabilities. With the withdrawal of the US as a credible player in NATO, whether it formally withdrew from the alliance or not, the threat of Russia's nuclear arsenal would enter the equation. President Putin recently pointed out that Russia had more nuclear warheads than NATO (including the US), and described this as Russia's “competitive advantage”. With Ukraine's neighbors no longer shielded by the US nuclear umbrella, Russian might lose its inhibitions about the threat or use of its significant arsenal of battlefield nuclear weapons, some which are now based in Belarus, which borders Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian war-fighting ability has been depleted by the war with Ukraine, and NATO's European allies might have a breathing space of a Presidential term or two before Russia could contemplate further military adventures. Yet whatever the European allies did with that breathing space, they could not compensate for the loss of the US's nuclear umbrella. On that basis I have argued that the best strategy for Europe's NATO allies, if Trump gains the White House and pulls the plug on Ukraine and NATO, it is a political campaign to bring the administration after Trump back into NATO. Until then, the European allies would have to hold the line against Russia with their existing and hopefully expanding conventional military forces.